Anonymity, Pseudonymity and E-participation

This is a follow up to a previous post discussing the pros and cons of anonymity in e-participation. These are the main points found there Greater anonymity may increase uncivil behaviour and the use of offensive words[21,22]. Greater anonymity may reduce comment...

Encoding plaintexts in ElGamal

The nVotes voting system uses an ElGamal re-encryption mixnet to ensure ballot privacy. When using ElGamal encryption it is necessary to first encode protected data into the plaintext space where ElGamal operates in. Once encoded in this space, the information can be...

Ballot privacy for weighted voting

In previous posts we have discussed the idea of degree of privacy and its application to weighted voting. In those posts we were concerned about what can be revealed about voter’s choices given an election result. We saw an attack method where privacy was...

Degree of privacy for weighted voting

In the two previous posts we saw a general definition of degree of privacy for voting and a method to attack privacy in weighted voting. In the latter post we remarked The problem is that calculating the terms in the entropy expression is in general intractable due to...

A privacy attack on weighted voting

In the previous post we suggested an extension to degree of anonymity of (Diaz 2002) to voting. Recall the suggested definition for degree of privacy where we also mentioned that this extension could be useful for weighted voting, because in that case results leak...

Degree of privacy in voting

In this post we show a natural extension of the degree of the anonymity model from (Diaz 2002) for voting. The result is simple, but may be useful for complex cases such as weighted voting, where privacy concerns are not limited to the standard...